Goering and colleagues (2017) acknowledge closed-loop neural devices have the potential to undermine agency. Indeed, the authors observe that “the agent using the device may . . . sometimes doubt whether she is the author of her action, given that the device may operate in ways that are not transparent to her” (65). Still, the authors ultimately argue that closed-loop neural devices may be construed as supporting agency, especially when we view agency from a relational perspective. The reason? We often (...) manifest our agency in relation with others. For example, family and close friends sometimes step in to support us in setting and achieving our aims. In a similar way, then, the authors argue that “we can imagine [a closed-loop] device stepping in to support the user in achieving her aim” (67). Closed-loop neural devices, in other words, can be construed as supporting one’s agency in much the same way as other people can be seen as supporting one’s agency. The authors thus conclude that when we view agents from a relational perspective, closed-loop neural devices may be viewed as supporting rather than undermining agency. I largely agree with the authors’ conclusion. I also believe, however, that their discussion can be clarified by distinguishing three kinds of agency and viewing closed-loop neural devices from the perspective of each. By thinking carefully about agency, we can see more clearly the ways in which it is undermined by closed-loop neural devices, as well as the way in which these devices may support agency. (shrink)

Jecker & Ko (2017) argue that numerical identity is not the only aspect of identity that matters to patients faced with certain neurosurgical interventions. Put differently: surviving an intervention in the numerical sense—being numerically the same person before and after the intervention—is not enough. It also matters whether an intervention preserves a patient’s narrative identity, that is, whether an intervention allows the patient’s “inner story” to continue. I agree with the authors’ conclusion. I believe, however, that further work can be (...) done to show precisely why narrative identity matters. We can accept Jecker & Ko’s conclusion, but still wonder: why should it matter to us that our inner story continues? In this response, I suggest that the reason rests on a more basic concern we have with living authentic lives. We are concerned with preserving our narrative identities because we want to live authentic lives rather than inauthentic ones. If that’s the case, however, those considering neurosurgical interventions such as deep brain stimulation and temporal lobectomy should not only pay attention to ways the interventions may support or undermine narrative identity, but also to broader considerations about the ways these interventions may support or undermine one’s living an authentic life. (shrink)